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Amy Shuffelton

Why Posthumanism Now?
Amy Shuffelton
Loyola University Chicago
Therese Lindgren and Magdalena Sjostrand Ohrfelt have written a
tantalizing essay. Intriguing questions and lines of analysis are suggested to its
readers, but, like the fruit hanging over Tantalus’s head, which receded as soon
as he reached for it, some of the most interesting questions are left hanging.
Like Tantalus, the audience for this essay is getting its just deserts, insofar as
we are the ones who maintain the 4500 word limit on PES Yearbook essays,
but I hold out hope that a future, longer version of this paper will satisfy my
desire to hear more.
In this iteration, Lindgren and Ohrfelt note that the Swedish Skolverket
positions pedagogical documentation within a post-constructionist/posthumanist
framework. They situate the Skolverket’s new interest in moving away from
binary constructions, including culture/nature, human/non-human, mind/body,
intellect/emotion, and theory/practice, in social conditions both global and
uniquely Swedish. Specific to Sweden is the social commitment to state-funded
early childhood care and education for children as young as one, and the evident
willingness of nearly all parents to make use of such care. Global trends include
the interest in measurement, in part for the sake of competitive international
comparisons, and a growing belief that early childhood education is key to a
nation being able to make its children the winners of those competitions. Having
contextualized posthumanist early childhood education policy, Lindgren and
Ohrfelt draw on Thomas Popkewitz’s account of policy as effecting the “fabrication” of particular ways of being. They briefly sketch out a “fictional” – in
Popkewitz’s sense of fiction as making, as well as making up – account of the
posthuman children growing up through Swedish preschools.
“What elements and themes,” Lindgren and Ohrfelt ask, “are accentuated
when posthumanist theory becomes practicable and is presented as a method
in educational practice?” Because they have, appropriately, presented education
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policy as responding to the perceived problems of its time, one broad answer
to this question is the themes and elements raised by social, economic, and
ecological crises that have captured public attention during the past ten years
of European history. The essay refers in several places to these overlapping
and interconnected but also distinct crises. With reference to how children are
fabricated by Skolverket policy, they refer to a “political and philosophical notion
about the world as being in a state of (ecological, financial, political, refugee, etc.)
crisis.” Towards the end, they claim to have “discussed how the fiction [of] the
posthuman child is fabricated as a response to the contemporary environmental,
social, and financial crisis.” The pages in between, however, address in depth
only one of those crises: the ecological. It is not clear to me whether this is
because the ecological crisis is the focus of posthumanist Skolverket policy or
because Lindgren and Ohrfelt chose to focus on it. In either case, I wanted to
know more about how posthumanist policy addresses the other crises.
What really leaves me wishing for more, though, is a tension they allude
to in the conclusion, which points directly to the other, unaddressed, crises.
Lindgren and Ohrfelt point out that in a posthumanist approach, the child is
fabricated “as a prophetic being at the same time as it is wiped out (through the
dissolution of the subject).” A posthuman child, arguably, has no human rights.
Even if this entails no more than the replacement of one set of fictions with
another, where does this leave Syrian, Libyan, and other refugee children? These
children have been brought to Europe not out of their parents’ commitment
to living holistically with the natural world but rather out of desperate faith in
a Europe that has imagined itself as a bastion of rights protected by law, at the
national, regional, and international levels. Human rights, of course, have been
honored in the breach for as long as they have been signed into international
conventions. At the present moment, however, disregard for national and international laws and treaties heralds not a new posthumanist state of genuine
mutual respect but, instead, nationalist chauvinism. How, without human rights,
will the refugees’ hopes be addressed? How can posthumanism respond to
the ugly nativism sweeping Europe (and the United States, of course), which
promises to treat native-born children entirely differently than immigrant and
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refugee children? The recognition of this tension, in my reading, is where the
essay starts to get really interesting.
I am not convinced Lindgren and Ohrfelt could have discussed all the
crises they mention – social and financial, as well as ecological – in 4500 words,
especially given their commendable commitment to providing scholarly references. Even if they more explicitly tied the refugee crisis, the financial crisis,
and the ecological crisis together (as surely could be done, but would require
explanation), the essay would be significantly longer.
In 1999, Francis Schrag published a paper called “Why Foucault Now?.”
In it, he argued that education scholars (including, prominently, his colleague
at UW Madison, Thomas Popkewitz) were drawn to Foucault at that particular
moment because Foucault offered a stance on education, power, freedom,
and the potential of politics to make a difference that spoke to hopes raised
by social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, hopes that were dashed by the
conservatism and infighting of the 1980s and 1990s. Rather than promising a
road to utopia through revolution, Foucault’s writing offers critique that aims to
promote change by puncturing complacency. And with revolutionary Marxism
hard to believe in after 1989, Foucault offered, in Schrag’s words, an appealing
means “for scholars, especially those with a flair for theorizing, to believe that,
no matter how esoteric or precious their formulations, and no matter how
limited their audiences, they are, even as they theorize, social activists engaged
in laying the ground for social transformation.”1
Suppose that, instead of taking Schrag’s word as a settled verdict on
Foucault, on Popkewitz, and on scholarship like Lindgren’s and Ohrfelt’s, which
incorporates Foucaultian modes of critique, readers take it as a gauntlet thrown
at their feet. Why posthumanism now? Why dissolve human autonomy at the
precise moment when refugees are streaming into Europe to claim their share
of what the Enlightenment has produced? Is this because posthumanism
shows the way to a politics that can supersede the binary thinking that supports
colonialism, the exploitation and degradation of the earth, and the dehumanization of others? Or is it merely an attempt to give up on politics at exactly
the moment when future citizens of Europe (and the United States, Canada,
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2017

279

Why Posthumanism Now?

280

and Australia) include Muslims, Africans, and others of the global poor? Foucaultian scholarship on educational policy, including Popketwitz’s account of
fabrication, has enriched readers’ understanding of politics by shifting our focus
from the political to the ontological. Only by attending to the ontological, can
philosophers of education consider what other ways of being in the world
education might make possible. After that, though, these new fabrications will
still have to find a way to live together, and that is the work of politics. When
posthumanism is carried into policy, carried out by human beings as all policy
is, the questions become political once again.
By bringing posthumanist inquiry into the domain of educational policy,
the Skolverket raises such questions. In this essay, Lindgren and Ohrfelt have
taken an initial look at some of the questions posthumanist education policy
raises. I look forward to hearing more.

1 Francis Schrag, “Why Foucault Now?,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 31, no. 4

(1999): 375-383, 382.
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